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iii.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is

an appeal by

the Defendant/Appellant from

a final

Order dated January 15, 1993, wherein the Third Judicial District
Court,

Honorable

Judge

Richard

H.

Moffat

presiding,

Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default
Court has

jurisdiction

pursuant

to Utah

denied

Judgment. This

Code

Ann.

§

78-2a-

3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did

the Third

Judicial District

Court err

in denying

Defendant#s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment?
2.

Did

discretion

the

Third

in denying

Judicial

District

Defendant's Motion

Court

to Set

abuse

its

Aside Default

Judgment?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The decision of a trial court to deny a motion should not be
reversed

unless

discretion, [See,

it

is

shown

Christenson

that

there

v. Jewkes,

was
761

an

abuse

P.2d 1375

1988); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P. 2d 1318 (Utah 1987);
Garczynski,

78 F.R.D.

55(c) and 60(b) of the
standard

of

appellate

134 (E.D. Pa. 1978)

in

discretion of the trial court.

1

this

(Utah

Spica v.

(interpreting Rules

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)].
review

of

matter

is

abuse

The
of

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
No

determinative authorities

Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rules

are contended,
55(c) and 60(b)

howeverf Utah
are applicable

and decisive as applied by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case and course of proceedings below.
Plaintiff/Appellee
filed

a

complaint

(hereinafter

against

referred to

as

Defendant/Appellant

"Potter")

(hereinafter

referred to as "C^l") on or about September 13# 1988. (R. 2-5).
The Summons and
1988

Complaint were served

by serving a

who is an

upon C-21 on

company representative#

attorney at law. (R. 10-12).

October 24,

Mr. Leonard Nielson,

Potter, after notice and

hearing, obtained a default judgment against C-21 on December 15,
1988, no appeal
attempted

having been taken. (R. 19-22). Potter thereafter

to negotiate a

settlement of the

judgment with C-21.

(R. 73). Approximately fifteen months later a motion was filed by
C-21#s counsel entitled Motion To Set Aside Judgmentf (R. 23-25).
Potter responded to C-21#s motion in a timely manner. (R. 56-77).
With the exception of an answer being filed by C-21 two and
half (2 1/2)

one-

years too latef no other action was taken by any of

C-21's attorneys until Potter filed

a request for decision under

Utah Code Ann., Code of Judicial Administration, Rule

4-501. (R.

89-90). The trial court then ruled upon C-21's motion

and denied

the same. (R. 91-95). C-21 filed the instant appeal. (R. 98).

2

B. Statement of facts.
Section A# Nature

The facts explicit and implicit

of the case

and course of

in

proceedings below#

above, are the material facts upon which this appellate court can
determine whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in
denying

C-21"s motion

to set

aside the

default

judgment- The

facts as stated in C-21's "Statement of facts relevant
presented for review11 are not
appellate court as

to issues

the facts to be considered

such facts are beyond the scope

by the

of review in

this Court raising collateral issues by way of alleged defenses.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
timely manner

C-21

had adequate

opportunity to

a motion to set aside

submit in

a

default judgment and failed

to do so; the trial court in reviewing all evidence before it

on

C-21's motion did not err in denying C-21's motion.
POINT II.

C-21 did not demonstrate to the trial court that

any basis under the applicable Utah Rules of Civil
met,

nor did C-21 show that it

original

Procedure was

had a meritorious defense to the

promissory note action,

and therefore* the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying C-21's motion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I & POINT II
C-21, in

its

attempts to rehash

"Brief

of

Appellant11# pages

alleged facts which

6

through

are not relevant

12

to the

issues presented to this appellate court. They are the same facts
as

presented in

subsequent

the

memoranda

Motion
in

to

support
3

Set Aside
of

such

Judgment,
motion

and
that

the
C-21

presented

to the

trial court

and which

the trial

court fully

reviewed.
The trial court made it clear in its
for the

denial of C-21's

discretion

in doing

motion and did

so. The

facts upon

minute entry the basis
not err nor
which the

abuse its

trial court

based its decision are as follows:
1. Previous counsel for Potter properly took judgment
against C-21 when C-21 failed to Answer Potter's
Complaint

after proper service of Summons and Complaint. (R. 20-

22).
2. Potter's previous counsel has no recollection of any
conversation with C-21's counsel regarding an alleged
stipulation that no further proceedings would occur. (R. 70-71).
3.

Potter's judgment was based upon a

valid promissory

note which was acknowledged by C-21 in a Report of
Examination prepared by Certified Public Accountant# Scott L.
Jensen, for C-21 on February 28, 1986, and noted that the
note# payable on demand, would not be demanded until 12 months
from that time (February 28, 1987). (R. 21-22).
4. After the judgment was taken on December 15, 1988,
Potter began discussions with C-21, and it's successors
in interest, for payment of such judgment. (R. 73).
5. Negotiations had been ongoing through about January of
1990 for payment of the judgment. (R. 71-74).
6. The allegations set forth in C-21's Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Set

Aside Judgment are over broad

and have nothing

to

do with

the

promissory note

and

judgment thereupon.

Such

allegations are designed to cast a shadow upon Potter's character
and raise issues that

are beyond the scope

of the issue of

the

promissory note. (R. 26-60).
7. It is simply too late for C-21 to raise issues that
are counterclaim issues to the judgment based upon a promissory
note. The judgment was issued on December 15, 1988. C-21 had
not filed the motion to set aside until February 26, 1990, nearly
fifteen (15) months after the judgment,

and, more significantlyf

more than a year after Potter began negotiations on settlement
of judgment with C-21 and it's successors in interest. (R. 73).
8. C-21 had not raised a meritorious defense to the
promissory note based judgment. (R. 91-95).
9. If C-21 wishes to sue Potter

on the extraneous

issues which are raised in itfs motion, which are issues
constituting an alleged counterclaim not based upon the
promissory
judgment

note,

then C-21

is valid

could

and should not

have done

so. However, the

be set aside

based upon such

extraneous allegations. (R. 92).
The trial court properly noted that in ordcsr for C-21
relieved from the
judgment

default judgment, it

was entered against

must not only

it through

to be

show that

excusable neglect, but

must also show that

its Motion to Set Aside was timely, and that

it has a meritorious

defense to the action- [See, State of Utah,

et al. v. Musselman, et al., 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983); see also,
3^ar sen

v.

Collina,

684

P.

2d
5

52

(Utah

1984);

Miller

v.

Brocksmith. 825 p.2d 690 (Utah App. 1992); Lincoln Ben,Life v. D.
T. Southern Prop,,

838 P.2d

672 (Utah App.

1992); Home Sav. &

Loan v, Aetna Cas. & Sur., 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991)].
In this

case C-21 claims

there was

a stipulation

counsel that C-21 would not be required to answer
Potter's counsel has no recollection of such

between

the complaint.

a stipulation. (See

Affidavit of Richard J. Leedy, R. 70-70A).
C-21's Motion was not timely. Nearly

fifteen months expired

from the time the judgment was rendered until the time the Motion
was filed.

During that period of time

Potter negotiated with C-

21, and its successor in interest, for payment and/or
of

the judgment,

Potter,

(see Affidavits

R. 71-77).

C-21

of Lowell

clearly had

settlement

Potter and

Thomas

actual knowledge

of the

judgment almost immediately after entry thereof.
Furtherf in denying a motion to set aside the default
judgment entered against a defendant for fraudulent
misrepresentation, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the
trial court did not abuse it's discretion in denying defendant's
motion and stated that each case must be looked at on its own
peculiar facts and circumstances, and no general rule can be laid
down respecting
Heath

v.

discretion to be

Mower# 597

P.2d 855

reviewed

the

findings

based upon those

leave

the

facts of

default

this

exercised by the
(Utah 1979)].

case

judgment

The

extensively,

facts rendering a
intact.

and

lower Court
made

its

proper decision to

[See, Workman

Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990)].
6

Judge. [See,

v.

Nagle

Notice of entry of the default judgment was not and is not a
requirement of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in circumstances
such as these. [See# Lincoln
838 P.2d 672f

675 (Utah

actual notice of

Ben. Life v. D. T. Southern

App. 1992)].

the judgment and

In any

Prop.,

event, C-21

acted upon it

had

by negotiating

with Potter for settlement before filing its motion to

set aside

the default judgment. (R. 71-74).
The default judgment in this case was based upon a
promissory note. The
default

judgmentwas

circumstances by
the court.
basis for
Olson,

amount was certain. The Court
of

all

counsel for Potter in a

pertinent

a collateral attack upon the
P.2d 602
as a

(1952)].

defense

are

Such
not

facts

and

default hearing before

C-21 now raises collateral issues

246

ostensibly

apprised

granting the

that cannot be the

judgment. [See, Bowen v.
collateral

sufficient to

judgment by default. [See, Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.

issues raised
set

aside

a

Schettler, 768

P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)].
CONCLUSION
The trial court

reviewed all the evidence

before it, which

is the same evidence before this appellate court:. The trial court
did not err in denying C-21's motion; and, further, did not abuse
its discretion in the denial of C-21's motion.
For the

reasons

supported by the
court#s

as

set forth

above,

record, C-21's appeal

decision of

January 13, 1993

1993 must be affirmed.
7

and

as

must fail and
and Order

adequately
the trial

of January 15,

Dated this

w
2-°t day of June, 1993.
T

s, P.C.
Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
I

hereby certify

that I mailed two

copies

of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE,
L
the following, this 23*^day of June, 1993:
Mr. Robert M. McDonald, Esq.
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON
455 East 500 South, #200

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. F. Keith Biesinger, Esq.
175 South Main Street, Suite 550
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

8

(2) true

and correct

postage prepaid, to

